

THE JUDGEMENT OF PARIS AND *ILIAD* BOOK XXIV*

ὥς ὁ μὲν Ἑκτορα δῖον ἀείκιζεν μενεαίωνων
 τὸν δ' ἑλαίρεσκον μάκαρες θεοὶ εἰσορόωντες,
 κλέψαι δ' ὀτρύνεσκον ἐϋσκοπον Ἀργειφόντην.
 ἔνθ' ἄλλοις μὲν πᾶσιν ἐήνδανεν, οὐδέ ποθ' Ἥρη
 οὐδὲ Ποσειδάων' οὐδὲ γλαυκώπιδι κούρη,
 ἀλλ' ἔχον ὥς σφιν πρῶτον ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος ἱρή
 καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης,
 ὃς νείκεσσε θεάς, ὅτε οἱ μέσσαυλον ἴκοντο,
 τὴν δ' ἦνῃσ' ἢ οἱ πόρε μαχλοσύνην ἀλεγεινήν.

Il. xxiv 22–30

It is now almost half a century since Karl Reinhardt first published what must still rank as the most brilliant and perceptive attempt to explain the significance of the above passage for the *Iliad* as a whole.¹ Perhaps the most impressive feature of his case is the way it finally provides an answer to the objection many scholars must have felt in their own minds since the terse formulation of Σ A *Il.* xxiv 25 ff. (v 522 Erbse): τὴν τε περὶ τοῦ κάλλους κρίσιν οὐκ οἶδεν· πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἂν ἐμνήσθη.² Reinhardt showed that, on the contrary, Homer's knowledge of the legend and the paucity of his references to it were quite consistent with each other, indeed formed a coherent whole. The story of the Judgement of Paris, although obviously presupposed by the plot of the *Iliad*, is very different in tone and *ethos* from the resolutely heroic spirit that Homer usually imposes upon his subject-matter.³ And its almost total suppression in this epic possesses positive advantages in literary terms:

τί νύ σε Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
 τόσσα κακὰ ῥέζουσιν, ὃ τ' ἀσπερχές μενεαίνεις
 Ἴλιου ἔξαλαπάξαι ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον;

Zeus asks Hera at *Il.* iv 31 ff. but Hera's reply contains no answer to this particular question, merely a reiteration of her ceaseless hatred for Troy. This expression of enmity would obviously be reduced and trivialised if the Judgement of Paris were explicitly mentioned by her or the poet as the ultimate inspiration of her hatred. Apparently motiveless malignity on the part of Hera or Athena creates an impression that is infinitely more formidable and sinister. T. C. W. Stinton's conclusion⁴ ('What Reinhardt shows is that the *Iliad* is consistent with Homer's having known the story; and the burden of proof now lies on those who say he did not') is perhaps too grudging. At any rate, Jasper Griffin is surely right to maintain⁵ that Reinhardt's article 'is, or should be, a landmark in Homeric studies'.

Nevertheless, Reinhardt does not supply an answer to every problem raised by this

* Colin Macleod kindly read and improved an earlier draft of this article.

¹ *Das Parisurteil*, first publ. in 1938 as vol. xi of *Wissenschaft und Gegenwart* (Frankfurt): republ. in *Von Werken und Formen* (Godesburg 1948) 11–36 and *Tradition und Geist* (Göttingen 1960) 16–36. A useful summary and critique of Reinhardt's views (and a list of those scholars who have accepted them) is provided by T. C. W. Stinton, *Euripides and the Judgement of Paris*, Soc. for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Suppl. Paper xi (1965) 2 ff; cf. J. Griffin, *CQ* xxviii (1978) 15 n. 49. Reinhardt was particularly impressed by the representation of the scene on the famous Spartan comb now dated to the second half or the end of the seventh century (cf. R. M. Dawkins, *The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta* [B.S.A. Athens 1929] 223 and fig. 127).

The latest examination of artefacts depicting this story is by I. Raabe, *Zu den Darstellungen des Parisurteils in der gr. Kunst*, Arch. Stud. i (Frankfurt/Bern 1972).

² The views of ancient scholars on this passage are conveniently collected by H. Erbse in his monumental edition of the Iliadic Scholia (Berlin 1977), v 520 ff. Aristarchus was particularly hostile to the idea that Homer knew the story (see A. Severyns, *Le Cycle Épique dans l'École d'Aristarque* [Liège 1928] 261 ff.) and resorted, as have so many since, to athetesis.

³ On the uniqueness of the Homeric poems' austere heroic world see especially J. Griffin, *JHS* xcvi (1977) 39 ff.

⁴ Stinton (n. 1) 3.

⁵ Griffin (n. 1).

fascinating passage. In particular, while showing in a superlatively convincing manner why the Judgement is not alluded to more often, he does not try to explain why it has to be mentioned at all, and why at this particular stage in the narrative, at this very late point in the poem. In this last respect one is almost reminded of the manner in which Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* keeps back until near its end two further explanations of Agamemnon's sufferings, in terms of the curse which Thyestes laid upon Atreus. In the drama, however, this postponement creates an element of developing suspense and tension that has no place in the longer and more varied plot of the epic.⁶ And there are one or two other individual features in these lines, already found baffling by the critics of antiquity, for which Reinhardt fails to find a convincing solution. No one today will be very disturbed at the phrase *ὅς νείκεσσε θεάς* (29) or so inclined to agree with the scholion's protestation *τὸ νείκεσσε οὐκ ἔστι κρίναι, ἀλλ' ἐπιπλήξαι ἢ διαφέρεσθαι* as to suppose a reference to some otherwise unattested version of the myth.⁷ As A. W. H. Adkins, for instance, has observed:⁸ 'we need not follow Leaf and Bayfield's dictum "νείκεσσε, too, makes no sense; the verb means only to quarrel or to rebuke", for the verb in fact means neither of these things; and when Paris gave his judgement that Aphrodite had won, the other two goddesses naturally felt his words to be hostile, and indeed would feel *ἐλεγχείη* at their defeat'. The phrase *Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης*, again questioned in antiquity,⁹ need cause us no delay either. The presence of Poseidon in line 26, sandwiched between Hera and Athena,¹⁰ is rather more problematic, however, than Reinhardt allows: he unconvincingly brushes it aside as parenthetical,¹¹ but the fact remains that as they stand the lines in effect present us with the remarkable statement that Poseidon, no less than the two goddesses, was angry with Troy and its inhabitants because of the Judgement of Paris. Nor do I find Reinhardt's treatment of *μαχλοσύνην ἀλεγεινήν*¹² in line 30 very convincing. *δέδωκε δ' αὐτῷ οὐ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὴν καλλίστην τῶν τότε Ἑλένην* is the scholion's rather naive comment, but there is a difficulty here that requires discussion. *μαχλοσύνη* (rendered 'lewdness, lust' by LSJ s.v.)¹³ is indeed very

⁶ See e.g. the remarks of Lloyd-Jones, CQ xii (1962) 190 ff. and 197 ff. (esp. 198: 'Cassandra supplies us . . . with the vital piece of information that gives the missing clue for which we have so long been seeking'). Compare too Aegisthus' rôle at the play's very end. The suspense I refer to particularly concerns the question why the gods impose upon Agamemnon his horrific dilemma at Aulis. For comparable postponements in drama of the motivation behind a divinity's anger cf. Eur. *Her.* 1308 ff. (Hera's hatred of Heracles due to jealousy of his mother: contrast the motivelessness of her anger as described by Iris at 831 and 840 ff.) and Soph. *Aj.* 758 ff. (Athena's anger against Ajax: cf. Fraenkel *ad loc.*, *Due seminari romani di Eduard Fraenkel*, Sussidi Eruditi xxviii [Rome 1977] 26.)

⁷ So, e.g., Wilamowitz, *Hermes* lxv (1930) 242 = *Kl. Schr.* iv 510 (effectively demolished by Reinhardt, *Trad. u. Geist* 28 n. 14), or H. J. Rose, *Humanitas* iii (1950/1) 281 ff. (cf. his *Handbook of Greek Mythology*⁶ [London 1958] 107). There is no need even for the modified suggestion made by Stinton (n. 1), 3 n. 4, that 'there may well have been a version in which Paris added insult to injury by open abuse'.

⁸ 'Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry in the Homeric Poems', *JHS* lxxxix (1969) 20, part of an interesting discussion of the Homeric implications of *νεικεῖεν*. It must be added that Adkins himself believes there are other reasons for supposing the relevant lines to be late.

⁹ Hence the variant *ἀρχῆς* for *ἄτης* here: see Stinton (n. 1) 72 for a defence of the latter. For the meaning of *ἄτη* here see Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 241.

¹⁰ Stressed by R. Hampe, *Neue Beiträge zur Klas-*

sischen Altertumswissenschaft, Fests. . . Bernhard Schweitzer (Kohlhammer 1954) 85 f. among others.

¹¹ *Trad. u. Geist* 28: 'Poseidon wird schuldigerweise wie eine Parenthese mitgenannt'. One explanation of this feature is that Homer obviously wishes to remind us of the trio of pro-Achaean deities mentioned at *Il.* i 400: Poseidon is far more relevant to that context than to the actual judgement of Paris. Compare the trio of gods overcome by the power of love at Soph. *Tr.* 499 ff. Hades is mentioned there because, as it were, he has been 'attracted' to his two brothers Zeus and Poseidon: the poet is more concerned to stress the omnipotence of love in every area of the Universe than to suggest that Hades' abduction of Persephone really justifies ranking him with his brothers as a seducer and rapist.

¹² Another phrase whose difficulty is attested by the existence of a *varia lectio*, *ἐρατεινήν* for *ἀλεγεινήν*. Aristophanes preferred to have the line end *ἢ οἱ κεχαρισμένα δῶρ' ὀνόμηνε* (v 523 Erbse). That would indeed be much more normal. But is Homer striving for a 'normal' effect?

¹³ Who add that its occurrence in *Il.* xxiv was 'rejected by Aristarch[us] as a word peculiar to women, but [is] used of Paris as effeminate' (cf. passages like *Il.* iii 39: *Δύσπαρι, εἶδος ἄριστε, γυναιμανές, ἠπεροπευτά* or xi 385: *κέρα ἀγλαέ, παρθενοπίπα*. Stinton (n. 1) 3 n. 4 alleges that *μαχλοσύνη* is 'used of men' in 'Lucian, *Alex.* ii', I presume what he means is that we find the phrase *ὁ Ποδαλείριος μάχλος καὶ γυναικομανῆς τὴν φύσιν* in Lucian *Alex.* (42) 11 (*sic*) (ii 336 Macleod). *μάχλος* too is usually restricted to women. *Ἡσιόδειος δ' ἔστω ἢ λέξις* says Σ A of *μαχλοσύνη* referring to its use in the Eoae of the punishment inflicted by Hera

much connected with Aphrodite, but hardly in this sort of context. It is more usually the *punishment* which the goddess inflicts upon those unfortunate victims who have slighted or ignored her powers or in some other way deserved her wrath. She takes her vengeance upon them by making them promiscuous or immoral: thus she punishes Tyndareus by making his daughters (particularly Helen) *διγάμους τε καὶ τριγάμους . . . καὶ λιπεσάνορας* (Stes. *fr.* 223.4 f. Page) and for some authors Phaedra is another similar instance of such harsh treatment.¹⁴ The idea that Aphrodite endowed Paris with this characteristic as a *reward* is surely very extraordinary.

In our search for a solution we will naturally give first preference to a theory that economically contrives to explain all of the above-mentioned difficulties. Let us see if this can be done. The existence of a certain number of symmetrical correspondences between the first and last books of the *Iliad* has long been recognised, not to say exaggerated.¹⁵ Equally established is the presence of a series of comparisons and contrasts between the two sets of quarrels that break out in the first book:¹⁶ the *ἔρις* between Achilles and Agamemnon on the human plane is mirrored by the *ἔρις* between Zeus and Hera which that mortal antagonism induces in heaven. An antinomy is thus introduced which is to run through the whole poem. The human strife continues unabated, leading to that tragic loss of countless lives announced in the proem to *Iliad* i. The divine strife is soon dissolved in laughter at the spectacle of Hephaestus' hobbling ministrations, and forgotten under the spell of the song of Apollo and the Muses.

I should like to suggest that this antithesis between men and gods continues into the poem's final book and plays a larger part there than scholars are accustomed to recognise. The traditional interpretation of the end of the *Iliad* supposes that the gods supervise Achilles' reception of Priam and ransoming of Hector, and that this unexpected act of human generosity is put into tragic perspective by Homer's persistent reminders (*Il.* xxiv 656 ff., 778 ff., 799 f.) that the war will inevitably resume after the ransoming of Hector's body. I do not wish to deny that this is partly so. But I think that the situation is more complex than this viewpoint allows, and that this complexity stems from Homer's mention of the Judgement of Paris.

In the first place, how united are the gods in their demand for Hector's ransoming? It is true that we are told at xxiv 23 f. that most of the gods pitied the fate of Hector's corpse; but this statement is at once put into perspective by two significant modifications. In the first place the response of the gods to Achilles' maltreatment of Hector is to encourage Hermes to steal the body: how inadequate this cheap trick is in comparison with Achilles' ultimate response on the human level! In the second place there instantly follows a list of the three gods who reject even this proposal. Only three gods indeed: but are there any divinities after Zeus more important for the *Iliad* than that deity's wife, his brother, and his warrior daughter? If the stress is upon the paucity of the gods who object, why has Poseidon been introduced in the illogical manner analysed above? Suppose, on the other hand, that the poet wishes to emphasise the lasting nature of divine grudges in contrast to Achilles' abandonment of his human *μῆνις* against Hector. The insertion of Poseidon becomes highly significant and easily intelligible. And if we press the detail too hard and object that only a little while back Poseidon himself gave us a quite different

upon the daughters of Proetus (*fr.* 131-2 MW): cf. A. Henrichs, *ZPE* xv (1974) 301 n. 17.

¹⁴ As Sosicrates *FGrH* 461 F 6, = *Σ Eur. Hipp.* 47 (ii 11 Schwartz), puts it: τὸ δὲ αἴτιον ὅτι πάσαις ταις ἀφ' Ἡλίου γενομέναις ἐμήνιεν Ἀφροδίτῃ, διὰ τὴν μνηυθείσαν ὑφ' Ἡλίου μοιχείαν κτλ. Further instances of human lust as a punishment due to Aphrodite's anger in Apollod. iii 14.4 (= Panyassis *fr.* 25 K) on the legend of Smyrna, in Parthenius *περὶ ἐρωτικῶν παθήματων* v 2. etc. I cite numerous other examples of such victims (who include males as well as females) à propos of the above-mentioned fragment of Stesichorus in my forthcoming commentary on that poet. The word *μαχλοσύνη* is not actually used in any of these cases but

the concept it represents is obviously there.

¹⁵ A sensible recognition of a degree at least of planned symmetry in Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962) 261 ff., who rejects the more extreme attempts that have been made to establish fairly exact correspondences. Add now to the works he cites on p. 401 Reinhardt, *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter* (Göttingen 1961) 63 ff., the important book by G. Beck, *Die Stellung des 24 Buches der Ilias in der alter Epentradition* (Diss. Tübingen 1964), and D. Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias* (Berlin 1970) 169 ff.

¹⁶ See especially Reinhardt, *Trad. u. Geist* 23 ff; cf. his book on the *Iliad* (n. 15) 96 ff.; W. Burkert, *RhM* ciii (1960) 140, etc.

account of the origin of his hostility towards Troy (*Il.* xxi 441 ff.) involving Laomedon's insults and threatened injuries after the building of the city, no great harm has been done, for Poseidon is still firmly registered in our minds within the company of gods who cherish undying hatreds because of past offences. Now the Judgement of Paris in itself might not seem a wholly suitable vehicle for emphasising the hostilities of the gods: if two goddesses are permanently estranged, one is gained as an ally, and she rewards Paris with the gift of the most beautiful woman in the world. But we have already seen that Homer describes Aphrodite's gift to Paris in a phrase that positively suggests divine malice and punishment. The initially puzzling occurrence of Poseidon's name becomes a further stage in transforming the original nature of the legend and giving it a new significance in the context of *Il.* xxiv.

It is generally assumed that the gods themselves instruct Achilles (by means of his mother Thetis) to ransom Hector's body. But again the truth is rather more complex. It is Zeus, in fact, who takes the step of summoning and instructing Thetis and who anticipates Achilles' actual response to Priam (157 f.). It is Zeus who sends Hermes to safeguard Priam's journey to and from Achilles' hut. No significant mortal action in Homer's poems occurs by chance or without divine prompting, from Achilles' summoning of the assembly and his checking of the impulse to kill Agamemnon in Book i onwards. Zeus is king of the gods, and it may be said of the activities at the end of the epic, as of those foreshadowed in its proem, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή. The situation as regards the rest of the gods is both more vague and more complicated. The two passages where it is implied that the gods are united in their attitude to Achilles need careful consideration. They both occur within speeches by Zeus in which he is putting all the pressure he can muster upon first Hera (xxiv 65) and then Thetis (113 f.) to accept his will. Scholars have been too slow in the past to take into account the rhetorical context of such references to what the other gods think of Achilles' behaviour. For instance, Apollo at xxiv 33 and 39 assumes for the sake of more effective rhetoric that the rest of the gods support Achilles, although this seems at odds with 23. He obviously wishes to raise feelings of shame by this implication. Likewise, it would be inept if Zeus, in applying pressure to Hera, conceded that Athena and Poseidon also shared her viewpoint! But there is nothing in the text¹⁷ to suggest that any of these deities abandons his or her resentment: contrast Vergil's special stress upon Juno's reconciliation with the Trojans at the end of the Aeneid (see below p. 61). We are to assume that they fall in with Zeus' plan, as indeed they must; but there is no detail to modify the picture of their eternal resentment conjured up by mention of the Judgement. And it can hardly be maintained that the unexpected generosity which Achilles displays to Priam is, down to every last detail, completely and fully provided for and anticipated even by Zeus. His brisk and colourless request (74 ff.)

ἀλλ' εἴ τις καλέσειε θεῶν Θέτιν ἄσσον ἐμεῖο,
ὄφρα τί οἱ εἴπω πυκνὸν ἔπος, ὥς κεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
δώρων ἐκ Πριάμοιο λάχῃ ἀπό θ' Ἔκτορα λύσῃ.

which Thetis obligingly conveys as colourlessly (137: ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ λύσον, νεκροῖο δὲ δέξαι ἄποινα) and the promise of κῦδος at 110, in no way prepare us for the complexities and idiosyncrasies, the 'touchy and evanescent humanity' to borrow Kirk's phrase,¹⁸ of Achilles' ultimate response.

By now, the interpretation I place upon the Judgement of Paris and its place within Book xxiv should be fairly clear. If the first book of the *Iliad* showed human quarrels persisting and divine strife easily quelled, the antithesis is largely reversed in the last. On the mortal level Achilles abandons his anger and becomes finally reconciled with Priam and with humanity. On the divine level the first explicit mention of the Judgement reminds us of grudges and

¹⁷ On the significance of Hera and Athena's reception of Thetis at 97 ff. see, e.g., Griffin (n. 1) 12: 'the gods . . . receive her with a golden cup and cheering words. . . . Among these gods even a mourner must

drink and be of good cheer'; cf. B. K. Braswell, CQ xxi (1971) 23 f.

¹⁸ Kirk (n. 15) 366.

resentments which are not resolved, but linger on relentlessly and inexorably, to issue in the destruction of Troy. The gods continue to provide a foil to the attitudes and actions of the mortal world.

This interpretation seems to me to be supported by what immediately follows the allusion to the Judgement of Paris in our text. Apollo, the only other Iliadic divinity who can rank in importance alongside the three deities associated with the Judgement, upbraids the gods for favouring Achilles at Hector's expense (xxiv 35 ff.). He thereby elicits an angry retort from Hera. She reminds him (56 ff.) that Hector is a mere mortal, while Achilles is the son of a goddess reared by Hera herself, who had arranged for Thetis to marry the mortal Peleus:

πάντες δ' ἀντιάσθε, θεοί, γάμου· ἐν δὲ σὺ τοῖσι
δαίνυ' ἔχων φόρμιγγα, κακῶν ἔταρ', αἰὲν ἄπιστε

(62-3)

Not surprisingly, Apollo does not reply to this scathing indictment, any more than in *Iliad* iv Hera is prepared to explain to Zeus the root cause of her hostility to Troy, or Apollo himself is capable of revealing to Poseidon at *Il.* xxi 461 ff. his own motives for supporting the Trojans. What, in either instance, could he say? We are irresistibly reminded of the hostility which he exhibits towards the Greeks in general and Achilles in particular throughout the poem (note especially the cool malice he displays to Achilles at the start of *Il.* xxii and his role in the final killing of Achilles as forecast at *Il.* xxi 277 ff. and xxii 359 f.). Here too we are presented with an apparently irrational, unmotivated and inextinguishable hatred of god for mortal, similar to the depiction of the hatred of Hera and Athena earlier on in the poem. We know from late sources of a tradition whereby Achilles had apparently earned Apollo's loathing by slaying the Trojan hero Troilus in the very sanctuary of Thymbraean Apollo if not at the altar (*cf.* Apollod. *epit.* iii 31 and Frazer *ad. loc.*, ii p. 201 n. 3). Was Homer aware of this tradition? And did he suppress it even more thoroughly than he suppressed mention of the Judgement of Paris, with a like intention of excluding a tale whose tone is very unepic and unheroic, and with the like result of transforming a straightforward and normal resentment into something frightening and inexplicable? We cannot say for certain. But even if we are not meant to supply the above version as root cause of Apollo's anger, the opening scenes of the last book of the *Iliad* set before us the example of at least three divinities who refuse to forgive past injuries (Athena, Hera, Poseidon) in such a way as to concentrate our minds upon their malicious and unforgiving aspects. And Homer's representation of Apollo¹⁹ and Aphrodite further enhances this impression. The whole device sets in greater relief the action of Achilles in consenting to ransom the body of his great enemy Hector and send his father Priam away unharmed.²⁰

The pessimistic stress upon the inevitable resumption of war soon after Hector's ransoming thus gains an extra dimension. Not only is the human scope of this generosity tragically modified. We are also reminded that in the resumed war Achilles will die, and Priam will perish with his city: the resentment felt by Apollo, the resentment felt by Hera, Athena, and Poseidon, will find their fulfilment. Achilles and Priam may merge their differences in their common humanity. We are given no cause to suppose that the god who hates Achilles, the god and goddesses who detest Priam and his city, are capable of such generosity.

This is hardly surprising, since the gods do not have a common humanity, and are unlike mortals in some very significant ways. 'The gods live at ease and are strangers to death. Consequently they do not possess the heroic qualities which men must learn by accepting *μοῖρα*,

¹⁹ Apollo's speech at xxiv 33 ff. lays down how Achilles should behave, but our view of this intervention is very considerably modified by his constant hostility to Achilles, of which we are again reminded by Hera's taunting reply.

²⁰ Note especially the contrast between Achilles and

Apollo as regards the charge of *ἀπιστία* which is levelled against both of them in *Il.* xxiv. Hecuba warns Priam of Achilles at 207: *ὠμωστῆς καὶ ἀπιστος ἀνὴρ ὃ γέ* but the prediction is not fulfilled. Hera's criticism of Apollo in 63 is all too true.

and their "life of ease" has a sinister side.²¹ It is for this reason, to cite but one of the many instances to hand, that the battle of the gods in Books xix and xx of the *Iliad* comes as such a resounding and calculated anticlimax.²² Similarly, the compassion exhibited by Achilles and Priam at the end of the poem is another heroic quality which they as mortals have learned by accepting *μοῖρα*. Apollo, Hera, Poseidon and Athena, gods with rather less motives for their hatred than these two humans, exhibit no such quality, and this, I suggest, is why Homer finally mentions the Judgement of Paris, so near the end of his epic.

The viewpoint advanced in this article may become clearer if we compare and contrast the close of Euripides' *Hippolytus*.²³ There Artemis can only promise to continue the vendetta on the divine level by killing one of Aphrodite's favourites. When she withdraws, however, and Theseus and Hippolytus are left alone, a moving scene of forgiveness is achieved on the human level. Bernard Knox²⁴ has described the issue well: 'Artemis does indeed tell Hippolytus not to hate his father. . . . But this merely emphasises the gulf between god and man. She does not, on her plane, forgive Aphrodite; rather she announces a repetition of the terrible events we have just witnessed, a new human victim is to die to pay for the loss of her favourite. . . . The ending is serene, but the serenity has nothing to do with Artemis. . . . The serenity comes not from the goddess but from the two broken men who are left on stage after she withdraws. Hippolytus forgives his father. To err is human, as Artemis says to Theseus . . . but to forgive is not divine. It is an action possible only for man, an act by which man can distinguish himself from and rise above the inexorable laws of the universe in which he is placed.' We should not exaggerate the similarities of such a picture to the end of the *Iliad*.²⁵ But the continuation of grudges on the divine level, and their resolution by forgiveness on the mortal plane is common to both; and Hermes, no less than Artemis, departs from the scene of human reconciliation in which he can have no part.²⁶

Finally, I would draw attention to what I take to be Vergil's further reversal of the Homeric contrast between divine resentments and human generosity at the end of his own epic the *Aeneid*. Juno's hatred of the Trojans in that work obviously owes much to the Iliadic picture of Hera and her attitude to Troy. R. D. Williams, for instance, conveys this well when he observes that Juno's enmity has seemed 'so often perplexing and frightening as the poem has unrolled'.²⁷ Yet in *Aen.* xii 791 ff. Jupiter bids her set aside her resentment and loathing of the Trojans and she consents with surprising speed and readiness. Jupiter smiles, and reconciliation and peace are restored on Olympus. On earth, however, there is no such happy resolution: Turnus begs for mercy but Aeneas is overwhelmed by hatred and anger and kills the suppliant. The whole poem ends not as the *Iliad* does on a note of mortal reconciliation and reintegration, but surprisingly and distressingly on a note of continued hatred, hostility and rage. The unexpectedness of this ending

²¹ Griffin (n. 1) 13, paraphrasing and summarising important remarks by H. Erbse in *AuA* xvi (1970) 110.

²² See, e.g., Reinhardt, *Trad. u. Geist* 30 ff. and *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter* 446, Griffin (n. 1) 7 etc.

²³ The Homeric nuances of this scene have already been explored from a different angle by Griffin (n. 1) 10 and n. 31. The continuity between Euripides, Homer and the other early Greek poets is rightly stressed by Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (California 1971) 144 ff. (148 ff. on the *Hippolytus*).

²⁴ In *YCS* xiii (1952) 29 ff. (repr. in *Euripides: a collection of critical essays* ed. Erich Segal (Prentice-Hall 1968) 112 f. (sans footnotes) and in Knox's collected essays, *Word and Action* (Baltimore/London 1979) 227 f.

²⁵ In particular, the *Hippolytus* lacks the element of the *Διὸς βουλή* found in *Iliad* xxiv (where Hermes returns to safeguard Priam's journey back to Troy) and

has an additional, characteristically Euripidean, degree of bitterness.

²⁶ In both passages the deity provides his or her own explanation of the need to depart (Hermes at 463 f. claiming

νεμεσσητὸν δέ κεν εἶη
ἀθάνατον θεὸν ὧδε βροτοὺς ἀγαπαζέμεν ἄντην

and Artemis at 1437 ff. maintaining that it is not *θέμις* for her to behold a mortal's death), but it is hard not to detect a deeper poetic reason: cf. Reinhardt, *Trad. u. Geist* 234 on the Euripidean passage ('Es gibt kaum eine zweite Szene, die unter dem Mantel des Heiligen und Rührenden so anklagt') and Griffin (n. 1) 10, n. 31.

²⁷ In his commentary on *Aeneid* vii-xii (London 1973), on *Aen.* xii 79 ff.

has long been recognised.²⁸ But in praising its originality we should not forget what it owes both by comparison and contrast to the first and last books of Homer's *Iliad*.²⁹

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²⁸ A brief bibliography in Williams (n. 27).

²⁹ Of course I am here far from doing justice to the complexities of the end of the Aeneid, or even to the numerous Homeric echoes and resonances which Vergil combines in the closing scenes of his work, on which see (for instance) G. K. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer*,

Hypomnemata vii (Göttingen 1964) 322 ff. But note that Turnus' appeal to Aeneas (932 ff.), like Priam's to Achilles (486 f.), turns upon an appeal to the hero's father; and the death of Pallas, unlike that of Patroclus on whom he is in many ways modelled (see Knauer 298 ff.) annuls the force of this supplication.